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STATE OF UTAH 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
May 1 3 , 1993 
Mary T. Noonan, Clerk 
Utah Court of Appeals 
230 South 500 East #400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Re: State v. Steven Michael Stilling 
Court of Appeals No. 920186-CA 
Argued January 20, 19 9 3 
(Judges Russon, Jackson, and Greenwood) 
Dear Ms. Noonan: 
Pursuant to Rule 24(j), Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, I wish to direct the Court's attention to a recent 
decision of the Utah Supreme Court regarding motions to withdraw 
guilty pleas. The case is Salazar v. Warden, Utah State Prison, 
No. 910533, filed May 5, 1993. It applies to the following 
arguments in the State's Brief of Appellee in this case: 
At pages 25-26 of the State's brief, see Salazar, slip 
op. at 6-7 (supreme court's adoption of Rule 11 "strict compliance" 
requirement, while based on constitutional concerns, "did not 
purport to establish constitutional requirements." (emphasis in 
original)). At pages 27-29 of the State's brief, see Salazar, slip 
op. at 7 (at least when challenged via a petition for writ of 
habeas corpus, constitutional validity of guilty*plea as knowing 
and voluntary may be examined through evidence outside the confines 
of the plea hearing record). 
A copy of this letter, plus a courtesy copy of the 
supreme court's slip opinion in Salazar, is being mailed to counsel 
for appellant. Thank you for your attention. 
Yo/ars, 
mi 
Jv Kevin Murphy 
Assistant Attorney General 
cc: Jo Carol Nesset-Sale 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
236 STATE CAPITOL • SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114 • TELEPHONE: 801-538-1015 • FAX NO.: 801-538-1121 
This opinion is subject to revision before final 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
Ben Fidel Salazar, No. 910533 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
F I L E D 
v . May 5 , 1 9 9 3 
Warden, Utah State Prison, 
Defendant and Appellee. Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable Richard H. Moffat 
Attorneys: Joseph C. Fratto, Jr., Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff 
R. Paul Van Dam, Att'y Gen., David B. Thompson, 
Asst. Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, for defendant 
DURHAM, Justice; 
Plaintiff Ben Fidel Salazar pleaded guilty to first 
degree murder, a capital felony, and was sentenced to life 
imprisonment. He subsequently filed a petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus, alleging that (1) he had been denied the effective 
assistance of counsel, (2) the plea had been coerced, and (3) the 
trial court had failed to comply with rule 11(5) of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure in taking his plea. After an 
evidentiary hearing, the court denied the petition. Salazar 
appeals, and we affirm. 
Salazar was charged with first degree murder and 
aggravated sexual assault in connection with the strangulation 
death of Charlotte Montoya. The information also alleged as an 
aggravating factor that Salazar previously had been convicted of 
a second degree felony involving the use or threat of violence to 
a person. On September 7, 1989, Salazar pleaded guilty to first 
degree murder, and in exchange the prosecution dropped the charge 
of aggravated sexual assault and agreed not to seek the death 
penalty at sentencing. 
At the plea hearing, Salazar presented an affidavit 
setting forth the elements of the offense, a description of the 
conduct for which he was criminally liable, the rights he was 
waiving by pleading guilty, the terms of the plea bargain, and 
Salazar filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
on June 18, 1991.3 He alleged that his trial attorneys were 
ineffective, that his plea was involuntary because it was entered 
"with coercion and undue influence," and that the trial court had 
failed to comply with rule 11(5) of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. In support of the last claim, Salazar alleged that 
the court failed to adequately inquire as to his understanding of 
(1) the nature and elements of the offense to which he was 
pleading guilty, (2) the minimum and maximum sentences that could 
be imposed, and (3) the terms of the plea agreement, as required 
by rule 11(5)(d)-(f). As a result, Salazar alleged, he was 
restrained "in violation [of] and contrary to the provisions of 
Amendments V and VI, United States Constitution and Article I, 
Sections 7 and 12, Constitution of the State of Utah." 
The habeas court4 held an evidentiary hearing at which 
Salazar and both of his trial attorneys testified. Salazar 
testified that his attorneys never discussed the elements of the 
crime with him. Specifically, he testified that they never 
informed him that he would be pleading to "intentionally or 
knowingly" causing Ms. Montoya/s death. He stated that while he 
had admitted killing Ms. Montoya, he had always maintained that 
the killing was not intentional or knowing. Salazar also 
testified that he never read rne affidavit; rather, he only had a 
chance to "glance" at it whil*_ in the holding cell before 
entering his plea. Salazar admitted that he saw the portion of 
the affidavit stating that he was charged with "intentionally or 
knowingly" killing Ms. Montoya, but he explained that when he 
protested to one of his attorneys, she just ignored him. 
One of Salazar's former trial attorneys, Frances 
Palacios, testified that while she had no independent 
recollection of going through the affidavit and explaining the 
elements of the crime to Salazar, she would not have signed the 
affidavit if she had not gone over it with him first. She also 
stated that she believed he understood what he was admitting. 
Salazar's other trial attorney, James Bradshaw, testified that he 
specifically discussed the mens rea element of first degree 
murder and that Salazar was not reluctant to admit to an 
"intentional" killing as defined by statute. And while 
3
 Salazar had filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea in 
September 1990. After counsel was appointed to represent him, he 
filed this petition for habeas corpus. At the hearing, the 
motion to withdraw was dismissed as untimely under section 
77-13-6(2)(b) of the Utah Code, which provides that such a motion 
must be brought within thirty days after the date of the entry of 
the plea. Salazar did not appeal from this ruling; he challenges 
only the denial of the habeas petition. 
4
 The habeas petition was heard by the same judge who 
accepted the guilty plea. 
3 No. 910533 
A writ of habeas corpus is available only "where the 
petitioner has suffered an obvious injustice or a substantial 
denial of a constitutional right." Gerrish v. Barnes, 844 P.2d 
315, 319 (Utah 1992). Former Rule of Civil Procedure 65B(i)(l), 
which was in effect when Salazar filed his petition, allowed 
relief by writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner "who asserts that 
in any proceedings which resulted in his commitment there was a 
substantial denial of his rights under the Constitution of the 
United States or of the state of Utah, or both." Utah R. Civ. P. 
65B(i)(1) (1990).7 Salazar does not claim any errors other than 
the purported failure to comply with Utah Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 11(5). Thus, he is entitled to relief only if the 
alleged violation of rule 11 is also a violation of his 
constitutional rights. 
Because a guilty plea involves the waiver of a number 
of important rights, including the right to a jury trial, the 
right to confront one's accusers, and the privilege against self-
incrimination, a guilty plea is not valid unless it is knowing 
and voluntary. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 
(1969). And because a guilty plea is in effect an admission not 
only that the defendant did certain acts, but also that the 
defendant committed a certain crime, such a plea cannot be 
voluntary "unless the defendant received *real notice of the true 
nature of the charge against him, the first and most universally 
recognized requirement of due process./M Henderson v. Morgan, 
426 U.S. 637, 645 (1976) (quoting Smith v. O'Gradv. 312 U.S. 329, 
334 (1941)); accord Marshall v. Lonberaer. 459 U.S. 422, 436 
(1983) (also quoting Smith); McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 466. Rule 11 
is designed to protect these rights by ensuring that the 
defendant receives full notice of the charges, the elements, how 
the defendant's conduct amounts to a crime, the consequences of 
the plea, etc. However, compliance with rule 11 is not 
constitutionally required. 
Utah's rule 11 is patterned after Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 11. Federal courts have established that 
noncompliance with the federal rule is not necessarily a 
* (Footnote continued.) 
denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, for example, 
failure to strictly comply with the rule would be grounds for 
reversal. We merely hold that on collateral attack of a 
conviction, the petitioner must show a constitutional violation 
to obtain relief. 
7
 This rule was substantially amended effective September 1, 
1991. Rule 65B(b)(1) now provides that relief may be available 
to anyone whose "commitment resulted from a substantial denial of 
rights." We need not decide whether the new language was 
intended to broaden the scope of the writ to provide a remedy for 
nonconstitutional violations. 
5 No. 910533 
State v. Smith, 777 P.2d 464 (Utah 1989), and State v. Maauire, 
830 P.2d 216 (Utah 1992), both involved direct appeals, and both 
cases involved construction and application of rule 11 rather 
than the Utah Constitution. 
Thus, a failure to comply with Utah's rule 11 in taking 
a guilty plea does not in itself amount to a violation of a 
defendant's rights under either the Utah or the United States 
Constitution. To obtain a writ of habeas corpus, a petitioner 
must show more than a violation of the prophylactic provisions of 
rule 11; he or she must show that the guilty plea was in fact not 
knowing and voluntary. Further, a court considering such a claim 
is not limited to the record of the plea hearing but may look at 
the surrounding facts and circumstances, including the 
information the petitioner received from his or her attorneys 
before entering the plea. See, e.g., Henderson, 426 U.S. at 644-
47 (upholding findings of trial court, made after evidentiary 
hearing, that petitioner's attorney never explained elements of 
crime to his client); Gaddv v. Linahan. 780 F.2d 935 (11th Cir. 
1986) (remanding for evidentiary hearing to determine what 
information petitioner received and understood concerning 
elements of crime before entering his plea). 
After the hearing on Salazar's claim, the court found 
that the elements and facts of the crime were explained to 
Salazar, JLhat he understood the possible penalties, and that he 
understood the plea bargain. Salazar does not challenge these 
findings, and given the evidence received at the hearing, we 
cannot say that they are clearly erroneous. See Termunde v. Utah 
State Prison. 789 P.2d 709, 710 (Utah 1990). Further, the trial 
court concluded that the plea "was a voluntary and intelligent 
choice by Salazar and that the same was entered knowingly and 
voluntarily by Salazar." Salazar likewise does not challenge 
this conclusion. Because Salazar has failed to establish that 
his constitutional rights were violated, he is not entitled to 
relief by habeas corpus. 
The decision of the trial court is affirmed. 
WE CONCUR: 
Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice Richard C. Howe, Associate 
Chief Justice 
I. Daniel Stewart, Justice Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice 
7 No. 910533 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
STEVEN MICHAEL STILLING, 
Defendant-Appellant• 
Case No. 920186-CA 
Priority No. 3 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant Steven Michael Stilling appeals the trial 
court's denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas to 
three counts of robbery, second degree felonies under Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-301 (1990). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. S 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1992). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Defendant identifies three issues on appeal. As set 
forth more fully in the body of this brief, this appeal can be 
most effectively resolved by addressing only defendant's third 
issue, albeit in different fashion than he has framed it. 
Accordingly, the State addresses the issues as follows: 
1. Can the Trial Court's Denial of Defendant's Plea 
Withdrawal Motion be Affirmed on the Ground that the Guilty 
Pleas, Entered in 1985, were Entered in Substantial Compliance 
with Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure? Under the law 
applicable to this case, a trial court's denial of a motion to 
withdraw a guilty plea is reversed on appeal only "if it clearly 
appears that that trial judge abused his discretion." State v. 
Mildenhall, 747 P.2d 422, 424 (Utah 1987). This standard applies 
to the ultimate denial of defendant's plea withdrawal motion. 
However, the State must first overcome the trial 
court's subsidiary ruling that Rule 11 had not been substantially 
obeyed when defendant's pleas were entered. This is a question 
of law, addressed without deference to that subsidiary ruling, 
upon review of the record made at the time the guilty pleas were 
entered. See State v. Hoff, 814 P.2d 1119, 1124-25 (Utah 1991) 
(reviewing plea affidavit and colloquy, and "concludfing] that 
the judge who took the plea substantially complied with Rule 
11(5)"); State v. Rodriguez. 718 P.2d 395 (Utah 1986) (per 
curiam) (reviewing record and "expiation agreement" submitted at 
time of plea, and upholding plea). 
2. If Defendant's Guilty Pleas were Not Entered in 
Substantial Compliance with Rule 11, was it Proper for the Trial 
Court, upon Litigation of the Plea Withdrawal Motion, to Receive 
Additional Evidence Bearing on the Question of Whether Defendant 
Knowingly and Voluntarily Entered those Pleas? The State agrees 
with defendant that this issue is one of law, hence reviewed 
without deference to the trial court. City of Monticello v. 
Christensen, 788 P.2d 513, 516 (Utah 1990). 
3. If Additional Evidence Bearing on the Voluntary and 
Knowing Nature of the Guilty Pleas Could be Properly Admitted, 
Could such Evidence Properly Include the Testimony of Counsel who 
2 
Represented Defendant at the Time he Entered those Pleas? This 
issue appears to be one of law, in that it involves the 
interpretation of Rule 504, Utah Rules of Evidence, and Rules 1.6 
and 1.9, Utah Rules of Professional [Attorney] Conduct. See 
State v. Rio Vista Oil. Ltd.. 786 P.2d 1343, 1347 (Utah 1990) 
(statutory interpretations reviewed without deference); State v. 
Reed, 820 P.2d 479, 481 (Utah App. 1991) (admissibility of 
evidence is question of law). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, addresses 
guilty pleas as follows: 
(5) The [trial] court may refuse to accept 
a plea of guilty or no contest, and may not 
accept the plea until the court has found: 
. . . 
(b) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(c) the defendant knows he has rights 
against compulsory self-incrimination, to a 
jury trial, and to confront and cross-examine 
in open court the witnesses against him, and 
that by entering the plea he waives all of 
those rights; 
(d) the defendant understands the nature 
and elements of the offense to which he is 
entering the plea; that upon trial the 
prosecution would have the burden of proving 
each of these elements beyond a reasonable 
doubt; and that the plea is an admission of 
all those elements; 
(e) the defendant knows the minimum and 
maximum sentence that may be imposed upon him 
for each offense to which a plea is entered, 
including the possibility of the imposition 
of consecutive sentences; 
(f) if the tendered plea is a result of 
a prior plea discussion and plea agreement, 
and if so, what agreement has been reached . 
3 
The text of any other constitutional provisions, statutes, and 
rules pertinent to the resolution of this appeal will be 
contained in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant's three guilty pleas to robbery were entered 
in February 1985, and sentence was imposed thereon (R. 108; T. 
2/13/85 at 51; Nos. 16269 at 93, 16271 at 274, 16272 at 349).* 
Five years later defendant petitioned to set aside the pleas. 
The petition was amended twice before final clarification by 
defendant's present counsel (R. 1-3, 49-50, 61-63). The 
clarified petition took the form of a motion to withdraw the 
guilty pleas, alleging that they had not been entered in 
substantial compliance with Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure (R. 143-46, appendix 1 of this brief). 
The trial court heard oral argument of the plea 
withdrawal motion in October 1991 (T. 10/9/91). Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law denying the motion were signed on February 
7, 1992 (R. 157-60, addendum C to Br. of Appellant). Notice of 
*Record references in this brief are to the record of the plea 
withdrawal motion, in a cream-colored binding (R. 1-200); to the 
transcript of the entry of the plea (T. 2/13/85 at 51-61); to the 
transcript of the hearing of the plea withdrawal motion (T. 10/9/91 
at 1-50). The charges to which defendant pleaded guilty are 
commemorated in three red-bound volumes, identified by the last 
five digits of the case numbers, 16269, 16271, and 16272; of these, 
No. 16271 also contains the habitual criminal charge, Circuit Court 
No. 84-335F, which was dismissed upon entry of the guilty pleas. 
Such documents not already appended to defendant's brief will be 
reproduced in this brief. 
4 
the denial was given on March 16, 1992 (R. 195-96), and this 
appeal timely followed (R. 198).2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The State draws its fact recitation from all the 
evidence available to the parties and the trial courts at the 
times of the proceedings in question. A two-part recitation is 
given, first looking at the original entry of the guilty pleas, 
and then recounting the motion to withdraw the pleas. 
Entry of the Guilty Pleas 
Defendant was originally charged with four counts of 
aggravated robbery, first degree felonies under Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-302 (1990), and an enhanced penalty for being a habitual 
criminal, Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1001 (Supp. 1992), was also 
sought. At his August 1984 district court arraignment, at which 
he pleaded not guilty, informations on all of these were read 
verbatim to defendant (T. 8/31/84 at 95-98). 
After various pre-trial proceedings not pertinent to 
this appeal,3 a plea agreement was reached in February 1985, 
whereby the prosecution filed amended informations charging 
2The actual notice of appeal appears in the back of case file 
No. 16269, perhaps because it is mistakenly styled in part as an 
appeal from that conviction. This is, of course, actually an 
appeal from the denial of the plea withdrawal motion, which had its 
own case number, No. 900902323. 
3After sentencing on his guilty pleas, defendant appealed, 
claiming violation of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers in 
connection with the fact that he had been apprehended in Oregon. 
His convictions were affirmed, State v. Stillinas, 709 P.2d 348 
(Utah 1985). Convictions upon trial for other robberies, committed 
in Salt Lake County at about the same time, were also affirmed in 
State v. Stilling, 770 P.2d 137 (Utah 1989). 
5 
defendant with three robberies, second degree felonies under Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (1990), dropping the fourth robbery charge 
and the habitual criminal enhancement (T. 2/13/85 at 51, 56, 60, 
appendix 2 of this brief; second amended informations, Nos. 
16269, 16271, 16272, appendix 3). Defendant pleaded guilty to 
these reduced charges, specifying that he did not admit guilt, 
but wished to receive the benefit of the plea bargain (T. 2/13/85 
at 53-54). Along the lines of Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, the trial court questioned defendant about the pleas. 
With each question, the trial court sought and received 
defendant's oral understanding. The court first reviewed 
definitions of the originally-charged aggravated robberies, 
"committed with the use of a firearm," as opposed to the pleaded-
to robberies "by force or fear" (T. 2/13/85 at 52; see §§ 76-6-
301, 302). It noted the reduced sentences made possible through 
the plea agreement, specifying that the pleaded-to charges 
carried one-to-fifteen year terms, rather than five-to-life (T. 
2/13/85 at 52). The court warned defendant that his pleas waived 
his jury trial right, with the attendant rights to confront 
prosecution witnesses, to subpoena his own witnesses, and his 
privilege against self-incrimination (jLd. at 53). 
The court reminded defendant that his plea would be 
treated as an admission of guilt, even though defendant did not 
admit actual guilt (.id. at 53-54). The prosecution's 
recommendation of sentencing credit for time already served was 
elicited, and defendant stated that he had not been coerced into 
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entering the guilty pleas (id. at 54-55). Defendant asserted 
that he was not then under the influence of alcohol or drugs, and 
that he had reviewed his plea decision with counsel, and 
understood it (ixi. at 55). 
The trial court then reviewed a six-page "Expiation 
Agreement" prepared by defendant and counsel (R. 104-109, 
appendix 4 of this brief). The expiation agreement repeated the 
Rule 11 points addressed in the court's direct queries, and 
included some that had been omitted: for example, it recited 
that at trial, the prosecution would have to prove defendant's 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt (R. 106 para. c). It set forth 
defendant's understanding that his guilty pleas could result in 
sentencing consecutive to any other offenses for which he might 
be liable (R. 107 para, g), and that no recommendation as to 
sentencing, made pursuant to his plea agreement, would be binding 
on the court (R. 107 paras, h & i). 
The expiation agreement further recited that defense 
counsel had reviewed the facts of the cases against defendant, by 
interviewing prosecution witnesses and reviewing other 
prosecution evidence (R. 104 para. 1). Defendant acknowledged 
that he had conferred with counsel, and had decided that the 
circumstances of the case had left him "in a position of severe 
exposure on being convicted on the 1st degree felonies originally 
charged against me" (R. 105 para. 6). Accordingly, the document 
stated, defendant agreed to enter guilty pleas to reduced, second 
degree felony charges (JLd.; also R. 107 para. f). 
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The expiation agreement finally recited that defendant 
had read and understood its contents, and reviewed it with 
counsel (R. 108 para. 9). Besides being signed by defendant and 
counsel, defendant had initialled, in designated spaces, the 
lettered paragraphs a through k of the agreement. The trial 
court noted this, and further ascertained that the agreement 
contained a detailed recitation of the consequences of the pleas, 
and had been read, reviewed with counsel, and understood by 
defendant (T. 2/13/85 at 55-56). 
A space for the trial court to sign the expiation 
agreement was somehow left unsigned. Nor did the court formally 
announce that it found defendant's pleas to have been voluntarily 
made. Nevertheless, the court did impose sentence upon those 
pleas (sentences on Nos. 16269, 16271, 16272, appendix 5 of this 
brief). On appeal, defendant recites that these sentences were 
concurrent (Br. of Appellant at 3), a disposition that comports 
with Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(1) (1990) (unless otherwise 
stated, sentences run concurrently). 
The Plea Withdrawal Motion 
The plea withdrawal motion was heard by Judge Roth; 
Judge Hyde, who had accepted the pleas, recused himself from 
consideration of the motion (R. 44). As stated earlier, 
defendant's motion ultimately alleged that the trial court had 
failed to substantially comply with Rule 11, Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, when it accepted defendant's guilty pleas. 
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One of the several amendments to the motion, however, 
had alleged that the Rule 11 deficiencies were attributable in 
part to ineffective assistance by defense counsel (R. 62). 
Accordingly, the State obtained an affidavit from that attorney, 
Bernard Allen (R. 97-102, addendum B to Br. of Appellant). In 
his affidavit, Allen stated that he had discussed the case with 
defendant "at great length" (R. 98, 101). During those 
discussions, attorney Allen stated that defendant had 
made it clear to me that he fully and 
completely understood the facts of the case 
against him and the elements of the crime[s] 
that he ple[]d to in the [plea] negotiation. 
. . . There is no question in my mind that 
he fully understood what he was doing in 
entering the plea.... 
(R. 101-02). 
Defendant moved to exclude Allen's affidavit as 
hearsay, and as given in violation of the attorney-client 
privilege (R. 119-20). Responding, the State argued that in 
claiming that Allen had ineffectively represented him, defendant 
had waived his attorney-client privilege (R. 125). 
Then, however, defendant's present counsel entered the 
case (R. 135). New counsel clarified defendant's plea withdrawal 
motion, omitting the ineffective counsel claim (R. 143-45). 
Counsel renewed the request to exclude Allen's affidavit, on the 
ground that it was irrelevant to the question of whether there 
had been substantial compliance with Rule 11 when defendant 
entered his guilty pleas (R. 144-45). At the hearing of the plea 
withdrawal motion, this argument was presented, along with the 
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argument that Allen's affidavit violated the attorney-client 
privilege (T. 10/9/91 at 8-9). 
The crux of defendant's Rule 11-based argument was his 
claim that the trial court had failed to adequately inquire into 
the "factual basis" for his guilty pleas (T. 10/9/91 at 6-7). 
Elaborating through counsel, defendant argued that the trial 
court, before accepting the pleas, should have required the 
prosecution to proffer the evidence that would have supported a 
guilty verdict, had the matter proceeded to trial (id.)* Such a 
proffer, defendant argued, was especially important given that he 
had technically pleaded guilty while simultaneously refusing to 
admit actual guilt (Id.). 
The State responded that inquiry into evidence of 
actual guilt was discretionary, not required (T. 10/9/91 at 12). 
It also argued that even without attorney Allen's affidavit, the 
record when defendant entered his pleas demonstrated substantial 
compliance with Rule 11. The State pointed out that the 
informations, describing the victims, places, and times of the 
crimes, had been provided to defendant, informing him of the 
evidence (.id., at 13). The State brought defendant's expiation 
agreement to the court's attention (id. at 13-15). All this, 
argued the State, "indicates that Mr. Stilling was well aware of 
the evidence against him, of the facts involved in this case, the 
elements of the crime. He was making an intelligent decision to 
enter a guilty plea" (id. at 14). 
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After argument, the trial court entered findings of 
fact and conclusions of law denying the plea withdrawal motion 
(R. 157-60, addendum C to Br. of Appellant). It first held, "If 
the court were to rely only on the record as it existed at the 
time of the pleas, that record would be insufficient to establish 
substantial compliance with Utah R. Crim. P. 11" (R. 159). This 
amounted to an agreement that there had been inadequate inquiry 
into the evidence when the pleas were originally accepted: "At 
the time the plea was taken by Judge Hyde on the issue of Rule 11 
specifically, the issue of whether he convinced himself that the 
Defendant understood the elements of the crime and how the facts 
related to it, he was not in substantial compliance with Rule 11" 
(T. 10/9/91 at 43). 
Notwithstanding its ruling on Rule 11 compliance, the 
trial court perceived the key question to be whether defendant's 
plea had been knowingly and voluntarily entered. It held that 
the State could properly provide evidence, obtained after the 
plea was entered, to answer this question, and thus "cure" the 
Rule 11 defect (R. 159, T. 10/9/91 at 44). Accordingly, the 
court admitted attorney Allen's affidavit as evidence on this 
question (id.). Based on that affidavit, "coupled with the 
expiation agreement" (T. 10/9/91 at 44), the court held that 
defendant's guilty pleas had been voluntarily and knowingly 
entered (R. 159), and denied the motion to withdraw them. This 
appeal followed. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
As a proper alternative ground to affirm the trial 
court's denial of the plea withdrawal motion, this Court should 
hold that defendant's guilty pleas were entered in substantial 
compliance with Rule 11. Although the trial court ruled to the 
contrary, that ruling was induced by the erroneous assumption 
that before accepting the plea, it was necessary to inquire into 
the evidence of defendant's actual guilt. As this Court has 
already held, such inquiry, if required at all, need only be a 
limited one; further, the need for such inquiry is reduced, not 
increased, where a defendant pleads guilty while refusing to 
admit actual guilt. Accordingly, the trial court erroneously 
ruled that there was not substantial compliance with Rule 11 when 
defendant entered his guilty pleas. 
Although this Court need not reach the issue, it may 
choose to address the propriety of admitting additional evidence 
pertaining to the knowing and voluntary nature of a guilty plea, 
when compliance with Rule 11 in taking such plea is later called 
into question. The trial court ruled that such evidence is 
admissible; as a matter of settled principle and sound policy, 
that ruling was correct. The core due process query is whether a 
guilty plea has been knowingly and voluntarily entered. 
Therefore, a Rule 11 error, by itself, need not compel a 
conclusion that the plea was involuntary or unknowing. Such a 
conclusion violates the principle that errors that do not affect 
substantial rights shall be disregarded. It would also be bad 
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policy to allow the withdrawal of guilty pleas, based only on 
rule-based deficiencies, without regard to whether such pleas 
were in fact voluntarily and knowingly given. 
If post-plea evidence of a guilty plea's knowing and 
voluntary nature can be admitted, the question of the form of 
such evidence arises. Under evidentiary and attorney conduct 
rules, it appears that the affidavit of defendant's former 
counsel was not barred by the attorney-client privilege: 
defendant's allegation of counsel ineffectiveness "opened the 
door" to it. The former attorney also had discretion to breach 
the privilege to prevent possible fraud: his affidavit here did 
this without revealing the actual content of any privileged 
statements, and was therefore permissible. Finally, if there was 
error in this regard, it was harmless, for attorney Allen's 
affidavit only repeated information found elsewhere in the record 
of defendant's guilty pleas. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW 
HIS GUILTY PLEAS SHOULD BE AFFIRMED ON THE 
GROUND THAT THE PLEAS WERE TAKEN IN 
SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 11, UTAH 
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. 
Defendant appeals the trial court's use of his former 
counsel's affidavit as evidence that his guilty pleas were 
knowingly and voluntarily entered. This is a relatively 
difficult issue because, as set forth in Point Three of this 
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brief, it involves somewhat close questions about the boundaries 
of the attorney-client privilege. 
Fortunately, the issue framed by defendant need not be 
reached. Instead, this Court may affirm the denial of his plea 
withdrawal motion on any proper alternative ground• See State v. 
Brvan, 709 P.2d 257, 260 (Utah 1985), and State v. Harrison, 805 
P.2d 769, 782 (Utah App. 1991) (trial court ruling may be 
affirmed on proper alternative ground, even if court assigned 
another basis for it). Such an alternative ground exists here, 
in that defendant's pleas, contrary to the trial court's 
determination, were entered in substantial compliance with Rule 
11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
A. While the Trial Court's "No Substantial 
Compliance" Ruling Should be Reviewed Without 
Deference, Clear Error Can Also be Shown. 
Defendant's pleas were entered prior to the issuance of 
State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987), which mandates 
strict compliance with Rule 11 in taking guilty pleas. Defendant 
acknowledges that his pleas, therefore, are reviewed only for 
"substantial" Rule 11 compliance (Br. of Appellant at 9-10). 
State v. Hoff, 814 P.2d 1119, 1124 (Utah 1991). As many as three 
standards of appellate review may therefore apply. 
When a trial court denies a motion to withdraw a plea 
under the "substantial compliance" rule, that decision is 
reversed on appeal only if it "clearly appears that the trial 
judge abused his discretion." State v. Mildenhall, 747 P.2d 422, 
424 (Utah 1987). See also Jolivet v. Cook, 784 P.2d 1148, 1150 
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(Utah 1989), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 1033, 110 S. Ct. 751 (1990) 
(applying "clear error"-based standard of review). Such 
deference seems appropriate with respect to the trial court's 
ultimate decision to deny defendant's plea withdrawal motion. 
Here, however, the trial court actually made a 
subsidiary ruling that there had not been substantial Rule 11 
compliance when defendant entered his guilty pleas. To affirm 
the ultimate denial of the plea withdrawal motion, then, the 
State must show that this subsidiary "no substantial compliance" 
ruling was erroneous.4 Defendant correctly identifies this as a 
legal question, reviewable without deference to the trial court 
(Br. of Appellant at 2). Accord Hoff, 814 P.2d at 1124-25 
(reviewing plea affidavit and colloquy upon entry of plea, and 
"concluding] that the judge who took the plea substantially 
complied with Rule 11(5)"); State v. Rodriguez, 718 P.2d 395 
(Utah 1986) (per curiam) (reviewing record and "expiation 
agreement" submitted at time of plea, and finding "no merit" to 
claim of defective plea). 
Even if the trial court's "no substantial compliance" 
ruling might be deferentially reviewed, it was clearly erroneous. 
Clear error occurs when the appellate court is definitely and 
firmly convinced that a mistake has been made, ,or when the trial 
court's decision was induced by an erroneous view of the law. 
AOn appeal, defendant describes this ruling as a "critical 
finding by Judge Roth [that] has not been challenged by the state" 
(Br. of Appellant at 11). Having ultimately prevailed in the 
proceeding, the State was naturally disinclined to appeal any error 
made en route to the ultimate outcome. 
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See State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987) (quoting 
authorities). 
In light of the foregoing, the State will tackle the 
Rule 11 issue in decreasing order of difficulty. It will first 
show that the trial court's "no substantial compliance" ruling 
was induced by an erroneous view of the law. It will then show 
that on the record at the time the pleas were entered, there was 
substantial compliance with Rule 11. 
B. Because Defendant Pleaded Guilty While Refusing to 
Admit Actual Guilt, Little or No "Factual Basis" 
Inquiry Was Required Under Rule 11. 
As earlier recited, defendant urged the trial court 
toward the view that when a guilty plea is offered by a defendant 
who does not admit actual guilt, it is especially important, 
before accepting the plea, to inquire into the factual basis for 
guilt. He cites North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 
160 (1970), in support of this view (Br. of Appellant at 10-11). 
In the trial court, defense counsel offered to "bet bottom 
dollar" on its validity (T. 10/9/91 at 6-7). 
Counsel would have lost that bet. In State v. Smith, 
812 P.2d 470 (Utah App. May 30, 1991), cert, denied, No. 910347 
(Utah Jan. 21, 1992), this Court, interpreting Alford, addressed 
the question of how much factual or evidentiary inquiry is 
required to accept a "no contest" or "nolo contendere" plea. 
Such a plea is effectively identical to the situation presented 
here, where defendant has pleaded guilty while refusing to admit 
actual guilt. See Smith, 812 P.2d at 475, 478 & n.4; Alford, 400 
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U.S. at 37, 91 S. Ct. at 167 ("The fact that his plea was 
denominated a plea of guilty rather than a plea of nolo 
contendere is of no constitutional significance . . . " ) . 
The Smith Court noted that Rule 11(f), Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, requires federal courts to independently 
examine the "factual basis" for a guilty plea* However, the 
Court continued, "this requirement is not found in the Utah Rules 
of Criminal Procedure." 812 P.2d at 478. The Court stated that 
this omission appears to reflect a determination of Utah's Rule 
11 drafters "to limit independent fact finding," given that a 
guilty plea, by waiving trial, effectively waives such fact 
finding, jrd. at 478 n.3. The Court also quoted the federal 
rulemakers' decision that the Rule 11(f) "factual basis" inquiry, 
needed for a guilty plea, does not apply to no-contest pleas. 
Id. The Court thus concluded that arguments for a "factual 
basis" inquiry under Utah's Rule 11 are weakened, not heightened, 
when a defendant enters a no-contest plea. 812 P.2d at 478 n.3. 
Insight into the "variety of reasons," id., for reduced 
factual inquiry into a no-contest, or "guilty-but-not-admitted" 
plea can be found in Alford. The Alford Court did find that 
"overwhelming" evidence of the defendant's actual guilt supported 
his plea. 400 U.S. at 32, 37, 91 S. Ct. at 165, 167. However, 
it also noted a division of authority regarding the need to 
inquire into actual guilt when such a plea is entered. 400 U.S. 
at 33-34, 91 S. Ct. at 165. Most authority was that such inquiry 
should be limited, allowing a defendant who denies actual guilt 
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to nevertheless plead guilty to a reduced charge, as happened 
here, in order to avoid potential disaster in proceeding to 
trial, Jd. The Supreme Court agreed: "An individual accused of 
crime may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to 
the imposition of a prison sentence even if he is unwilling or 
unable to admit his participation in the acts constituting the 
crime." 400 U.S. at 37, 91 S. Ct. at 167. 
Subsequent to Alford, the overwhelming view has 
remained that inquiry into actual guilt is unnecessary, even 
inadvisable, upon entry of a no-contest plea. See, e.g., 1 C. 
Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure; Criminal 2d, § 177 at 671 
& n.41; 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law § 497 at 822-23 & n.63 
(1981). The inadvisability of such inquiry is supported by the 
plea's main purpose: the avoidance of subsequent civil action 
against the defendant. See V. Kanawalsky, Note, Nolo Contendere: 
Acceptance in the Federal Courts, 10 Memphis State L. Rev. 550, 
554-56 (1980). Inquiry into actual guilt would erode such 
protection, usually sought by those accused of "white-collar" 
crime. See id. at 556-58. 
Defendant's view that heightened "factual basis" 
inquiry was required because of his "guilty-but-not-admitted" 
pleas was therefore contrary to law. Such inquiry was, as the 
State argued, within the discretion of the court that accepted 
the pleas. Smith, 812 P.2d at 478; accord United States v. 
Cepeda Penes, 577 F.2d 754, 756 (1st Cir. 1978) (rejecting view 
that such inquiry was barred altogether). To the extent that the 
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trial court accepted defendant's view, its ruling that there had 
been an inadequate "factual basis" inquiry, and thus no 
substantial compliance with Rule 11 when defendant's guilty pleas 
were entered, was clearly erroneous. 
C. Defendant's Guilty Pleas Were Entered in 
Substantial Compliance with Rule 11. 
1. Contents of the "Record as a Whole." 
The State agrees that the only way to assess compliance 
with Rule 11 is by examining the record made at the time a guilty 
plea is entered. By its terms, the rule requires certain steps 
before the plea can even be accepted. Utah R. Crim. P. 11(5) 
("The court . . . may not accept the plea until . . . " ) . 
Accordingly, the affidavit of attorney Allen, prepared 
years after defendant entered his guilty pleas, is irrelevant to 
the question of whether there was substantial compliance with 
Rule 11 when those pleas were entered.5 However, defendant's 
"Expiation Agreement," presented to the trial court at the time 
of pleading, is highly relevant. That agreement was clearly 
equivalent to a "contemporaneously received [plea] affidavit," 
described in Smith, 812 P.2d at 476-77, and in Gibbons, 740 P.2d 
at 1313. See State v. Rodriguez, 718 P.2d 395 (Utah 1986) (per 
curiam) ("expiation agreement" showed validity of plea); State v. 
Eloae. 762 P.2d 1 (Utah 1988) (per curiam) (same). As such, the 
expiation agreement became part of the "record as a whole" 
5As set forth in Point Two of this brief, the affidavit would, 
however, be highly relevant to the question of whether defendant 
knowingly and voluntarily entered his pleas despite possible Rule 
11 noncompliance. 
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commemorating the pleas. State v. Maquire, 830 P.2d 216, 217-18 
& n.l (Utah 1991); Smith, 812 P.2d at 477. 
Nor can defendant seriously contend that the expiation 
agreement should be disregarded because of the trial court's 
failure to sign it. During the actual plea colloquy, the court 
addressed the agreement with defendant: 
THE COURT: All right. Now he's 
[defense counsel] also handed me a document 
entitled Expiation Agreement, which is multi-
paged document, at the end of each paragraph 
is a place for the defendant's initials. 
This bears the initials MS.S.M. I take it 
that means that you've been over this. If 
there's any questions he has explained them 
to you, and that's the purpose of the 
initials at the end of each paragraph? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: This goes over in greater 
detail than what I just went over with you, 
right? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
(T. 2/13/85 at 55-56). The expiation agreement was received and 
reviewed by the trial court, and defendant affirmed his 
understanding of it, as required by Maquire. 830 P.2d at 218, and 
Smith, 812 P.2d at 477, when he entered his guilty pleas. 
Accordingly, it should now be examined, along with the plea 
colloquy, to determine substantial compliance with Rule 11. 
2. Substantial Compliance: Elements of the Crimes. 
While this Court rejected a searching "factual basis" 
inquiry under Rule 11 in Smith, it did observe that Rule 11(5)(d) 
requires a determination that "defendant understands the nature 
and elements of the offense to which he is entering the plea . . 
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. ." 812 P.2d at 477. This crime "synopsis" requirement, id., 
was amply satisfied when defendant entered his pleas. 
First, during the plea colloquy, the trial court 
personally reviewed the charges to which defendant was pleading 
guilty, describing them as "robbery by force and fear" (T. 
2/13/85 at 52); accord Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-301 (1990) (robbery 
is "unlawful . . . taking . . . by means of force or fear"). 
This was contrasted to the original aggravated robbery charges, 
"committed with the use of a firearm" (T. 2/13/85 at 52); accord 
S 76-6-302 (1978) ("[u]ses a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm 
. . . " ) . 6 Defendant was thus clearly apprised of the key 
element of the pleaded-to crimes: he pleaded to robbing the 
victims by fright, but without using a firearm. Consequently, 
his understanding of the elements of the pleaded-to crimes was 
properly established. See United States v. Newman, 912 F.2d 
1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 1990) (critical elements, not every element, 
of pleaded-to crime should be explained). 
Next, defendant's expiation agreement acknowledged 
receipt of the informations listing the pleaded-to robberies (R. 
105 para. 5); those informations, in turn, set forth the place, 
time, victim, and witnesses to each offense (second amended 
informations, Nos. 16269, 16271, 16272, appendix 3 of this 
brief). See Maquire, 830 P.2d at 218 (information, incorporated 
into record, helps reflect Rule 11 compliance). The expiation 
6The aggravated robbery statute now refers to use of "a 
dangerous weapon." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1990). 
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agreement also recited defendant and counsel's belief that the 
evidence placed defendant "in a position of severe exposure of 
being convicted on the 1st degree felonies originally charged 
against me" (R. 105 para. 6). This demonstrated the knowing and 
voluntary nature of defendant's guilty pleas. See Marshall v. 
Lonberqer, 459 U.S. 422, 428, 437-38, 103 S. Ct. 843, 847-48, 
852-53 (1983) (oral stipulation that evidence could sustain 
guilty verdict supported guilty plea). 
Again, it was neither necessary nor advisable for the 
trial court, in accepting defendant's pleas, to make an 
independent assessment of actual guilt. That assessment was for 
defendant and counsel to mak€). "[T]he Constitution does not bar 
imposition of a prison sentence upon an accused who is unwilling 
to expressly admit his guilt but who, faced with grim 
alternatives, is willing to waive his trial and accept the 
sentence." Alford, 400 U.S. at 36, 91 S. Ct. at 167. Defendant 
made just such a fully-advised choice here. Indeed, by relying 
on defendant's assessment of the evidence, and not independently 
assessing it, "the trial court properly avoided pressuring [him] 
to plead one way or the other, helping to assure that his plea 
was voluntary." Smith, 812 P.2d at 479 & n.6. 
At this juncture, it is appropriate to revisit the 
"factual basis" requirement advocated by defendant, but actually 
absent from Utah's Rule 11. Inasmuch as that term means "factual 
basis for actual guilt," such was present here on the record as a 
whole, despite the lack of searching inquiry during the plea 
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colloquy. It would have been unnecessarily repetitive to demand 
an oral "proffer from one of the parties, typically the 
prosecutor, regarding what its evidence would be that would 
sustain a guilty verdict . . .," as defendant urges (Br. of 
Appellant at 10-11). Such "proffer" was effectively given in the 
robbery informations—received, acknowledged, and reviewed by 
defendant and counsel—which recited the particulars of the 
crimes and the witnesses who would testify to them. Accord 
Lonbercrer, 459 U.S. at 436-37, 103 S. Ct. at 852 (record 
demonstrated understanding of pleaded-to crime, even though 
evidence not expressly reviewed by trial court). The record here 
amply demonstrates that defendant understood both the crimes and 
the supporting evidence. 
It is further worth noting that a factual basis for 
guilt can be distinguished from a factual basis for pleading 
guilty. The former encompasses the actual evidence of the 
crimes. However, a factual basis for pleading guilty is provided 
when defendant, upon reviewing the evidence, believes that it 
could result in conviction at trial. A plea to reduced charges, 
based upon such an informed opinion, "represents a voluntary and 
intelligent choice among the various courses of action open to 
the defendant." Alford, 400 U.S. at 31, 91 S. Ct. at 164. 
Defendant made just such a choice here. 
In sum, it is abundantly clear that, as required by 
Rule 11(5)(d), defendant understood the nature and elements of 
the pleaded-to crimes when he entered his guilty pleas. Not only 
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was this "synopsis" requirement met, but Rule 11 was actually 
exceeded, for the record shows that evidence of defendant's 
actual guilt was presented, even though not required. 
3. Substantial Compliance: Other Rule 11 Factors, 
Beyond his "factual basis" or "crime synopsis" 
arguments, defendant does not seem to assert any other Rule 11 
deficiencies. Indeed, based upon the record of the entry of 
defendant's pleas—that is, the plea colloquy, the expiation 
agreement, and the informations received by defendant, it 
strongly appears that Rule 11 was strictly complied with- Only 
substantial compliance, however, was required. 
The only possible defect that the State can find is the 
trial court's failure to "advise the defendant personally that 
any recommendation as to sentence is not binding on the court," 
per Rule 11(7)(b) (emphasis added). Defendant acknowledged this 
understanding, however, in his expiation agreement (R. 107 paras, 
h & i). In Smith, this Court suggested that Rule 11(7)(b) might, 
by its terms, require oral review during the plea colloquy. 812 
P.2d at 477 & n.2. However, Gibbons implies that this is not 
necessary, in stating that the provision can be addressed in the 
plea affidavit, 740 P.2d at 1313 & n.5, and Maauire reiterates 
that Rule 11 compliance can be met "by multiple means," including 
an affidavit, 830 P.2d at 218. Further, defendant has not 
asserted that he was in any way surprised by the sentence meted 
out upon his guilty pleas. Accordingly, even if the non-binding 
nature of sentencing recommendations was conveyed to him in a 
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technically inadvisable way, he cannot be relieved of his guilty 
pleas on this basis. Instead, under Rule 30, Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, such technical error must be disregarded. 
For all of the foregoing reasons, the trial court's 
subsidiary ruling that there was not substantial compliance with 
Rule 11 when defendant entered his guilty pleas should be 
reversed. As a matter of law, the rule plainly was obeyed. 
Consequently, the court properly exercised its discretion when it 
ultimately denied defendant's motion to withdraw his pleas, even 
though it assigned another reason for that decision. 
POINT TWO 
DEFENDANT'S GUILTY PLEAS WERE KNOWINGLY AND 
VOLUNTARILY ENTERED; POST-PLEA EVIDENCE TO 
THIS EFFECT WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED, ALTHOUGH 
UNNECESSARY. 
The centerpiece of defendant's appeal is his argument 
that the trial court improperly admitted supplemental evidence, 
not presented when his guilty pleas were entered, to assess the 
validity of those pleas. Because the denial of the plea 
withdrawal motion can be affirmed solely as set forth in Point 
One of this brief, this argument need not be reached. However, 
to clarify the handling of motions to withdraw guilty pleas, as 
requested by the trial court (T. 10/9/91 at 45), defendant's 
evidentiary challenge may be briefly addressed. 
A. Defendant's Guilty Pleas were Knowingly and 
Voluntarily Entered. 
It is first worth noting that in moving to withdraw his 
pleas, defendant never asserted that they were involuntary or 
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unknowing, and therefore accepted in violation of his due process 
rights (petition to set aside plea, R. 1-3, addendum A to Br. of 
Appellant; memorandum of clarification, R. 143-45, appendix 1 of 
this brief). See Marshall v. Lonberqer, 459 U.S. 422, 431, 103 
S. Ct. 843, 849 (1983) (plea voluntariness is issue of 
constitutional due process). Even on appeal, he only alludes 
generally to the indisputable principle that "[t]here is no 
societal value in coercing fearful but innocent defendants into 
pleading guilty" (Br. of Appellant at 10); accord State v. 
Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1312-13 (Utah 1987). Defendant does not 
claim, however, that he was so abused: solely a Rule 11-based 
argument is presented. 
Even if defendant wished to show that his guilty pleas 
were involuntarily or unknowingly entered, he could not succeed. 
Based upon the same arguments showing Rule 11 compliance, set 
forth in Point One, his pleas clearly were constitutionally 
sound. By no stretch of imagination does this case approach the 
situation presented in Bovkin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 239, 89 
S. Ct. 1709, 1710 (1969), where "[s]o far as the record showfed], 
the judge asked no questions of petitioner concerning his plea, 
and petitioner did not address the court.11 Nor is this a case 
where, as in State v. Breckenridqe, 688 P.2d 440 (Utah 1983), the 
defendant clearly did not understand the requisite intent element 
of the pleaded-to crime.7 Instead, when these pleas were 
7In Breckenridqe. the defendant pleaded guilty to aggravated 
arson, involving intent to damage a structure, Utah Code Ann. § 76-
6-103 (1990), even though in his statements to police he had 
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entered, the trial court was assured that defendant, assisted by 
counsel, understood the crimes, weighed the risks and benefits, 
and made a fully informed decision to enter guilty pleas instead 
of proceeding to trial. 
Therefore, in considering the plea withdrawal motion, 
the trial court correctly ruled that defendant had knowingly and 
voluntarily entered his guilty pleas. The trial court did not 
need to consider any evidence beyond the record of the plea entry 
to arrive at that conclusion of constitutional law: that 
conclusion was compelled by the plea colloquy, the expiation 
agreement, and the information revealed therein. 
B. Had there Been Rule 11 Noncompliance, Supplemental 
Evidence Pertaining to the Knowing and Voluntary 
Nature of the Pleas Would have been Proper. 
Unless Rule 11 noncompliance is to be considered 
prejudicial error per se, it is appropriate to consider 
supplemental evidence pertaining to the knowing and voluntary 
nature of a guilty plea when a defendant later seeks to withdraw 
it. After all, Rule 11 assures the validity of a plea, but is 
not, in itself, the constitutional imperative that must be 
satisfied. This comports with the principle of Rule 30, Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure: unless a procedural error violates 
a substantial right, it must be disregarded. 
The Utah Supreme Court implicitly adopted this approach 
in Jolivet v. Cook, 784 P.2d 1148 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 493 
U.S. 1033, 110 S. Ct. 751 (1990). There the supreme court found 
clearly denied such intent, 688 P.2d at 441. 
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"clear" noncompliance with Rule 11 when the challenged pleas were 
accepted, 784 P.2d at 1149. However, the trial court held an 
evidentiary hearing on the defendant's motion to withdraw the 
pleas, and then denied the motion. j[d. The supreme court 
readily affirmed the trial court's ruling, set forth in written 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, that the pleas had been 
knowingly and voluntarily entered. JEd. at 1150. Similarly, in 
State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266, 1276 (Utah 1988), the supreme 
court remanded a case for fact finding on defendant's 
understanding of his plea bargain, a question encompassed within 
the requirement that a guilty plea be voluntary and knowing. 
Jolivet and Copeland demonstrate that it is proper, 
when a defendant later seeks to withdraw a guilty plea, to 
receive all evidence pertinent to the question of whether that 
plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered. As such, these 
cases, decided under Utah's Rule 11, control. United States v. 
Keiswetter, 866 F.2d 1301 (10th Cir. 1989), interpreting the 
federal rule, is not controlling. 
Further, wise policy suggests that supplemental 
evidence is desirable when, as here, a defendant moves to 
withdraw a plea years after it is entered. Compare Keiswetter, 
866 F.2d at 1301-02 (defendant moved to withdraw pleas eleven 
days after entering them). When a guilty plea is withdrawn under 
such circumstances, reinstating trial, evidence is likely to be 
stale, witnesses less reliable. The task of proving guilt beyond 
a reasonable doubt may be insurmountable. Worse, witnesses who 
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were traumatized by the crime(s) may be required to reopen 
psychological wounds during such a long-delayed trial.8 To 
avoid such undesirable results, if evidence can be found to show 
that defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived trial in the 
first place, even if such waiver did not fully comport with the 
letter of Rule 11, it should always be admissible. 
Finally, a guilty plea entered as part of a plea 
bargain should not be easily withdrawn. Here defendant 
originally faced four first degree felony charges, plus a 
habitual criminal charge; conviction of any one of these could 
have resulted in lifetime incarceration. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 
76-3-203(1) (first degree felony), 76-8-1001 (habitual criminal) 
(1990). Instead, he pleaded guilty to three second degree 
felonies, receiving concurrent one-to-fifteen year terms. Given 
the difficulties in trying the original charges now, defendant's 
plea withdrawal motion amounts, in effect, to a demand that he 
receive more than he bargained for in pleading guilty. This 
should not be allowed, except upon the clearest showing, by 
defendant, that his pleas were constitutionally defective. He 
has made no such showing here. 
8Indeed, in Smith, defendant pleaded no-contest to attempted 
sexual abuse of a two-and-one-half-year-old girl, an event that 
took place in September 1986. His attempt to withdraw the plea, 
entered in July 1987, began in September 1989. 812 P.2d at 473-74. 
A good argument can be made that requiring the alleged victim to 
testify at trial, had the plea withdrawal motion been granted, 
would itself have been a form of child abuse. 
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POINT THREE 
TESTIMONY FROM FORMER DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS 
PROPERLY USED TO DETERMINE THE VOLUNTARINESS 
OF DEFENDANT'S GUILTY PLEAS; HOWEVER, EVEN IF 
SUCH TESTIMONY WAS IMPROPERLY RECEIVED, THE 
ERROR WAS HARMLESS. 
Defendant finally argues that even if supplemental 
evidence of the voluntariness of his pleas was admissible, such 
evidence could not include the testimony, by affidavit, of his 
former attorney, Bernard Allen (Br. of Appellant at 15).9 
Again, this question of attorney-client privilege need not be 
reached in order to resolve this appeal: defendant's pleas were 
taken in at least substantial compliance with Rule 11, Utah Rules 
of Criminal Procedure, and were therefore valid. 
A. If the Question is Considered, Former Counsel's 
Affidavit Did Not Necessarily Violate the 
Attorney-Client Privilege. 
If the attorney-client privilege issue is addressed, 
the appropriate starting point is Rule 504, Utah Rules of 
Evidence. While vesting such privilege in the client, the rule 
also states that there is no privilege with respect to "a 
communication relevant to an issue of breach of duty by the 
lawyer to the client . . .." Utah R. Evid. 504(d)(3). Accord 
Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470-71, 9 S. Ct. 125, 127 
(1888). Defendant's claim of counsel ineffectiveness thus 
invited attorney Allen's affidavit in response. 
9In denying defendant's motion to quash attorney Allen's 
affidavit, the trial court ruled that defendant could submit 
supplemental affidavits, or call Allen to testify. This corrected 
any possible hearsay problem with Allen's affidavit. 
30 
Ethical rules are also relevant. Rule 1.6(b)(3), Utah 
Rules of Professional [Attorney] Conduct also restricts the 
attorney-client privilege when disclosure of a client confidence 
is needed " [t]o establish a claim or defense on behalf of the 
lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the client . . 
Rule 1.6 does not expressly except the privilege in order "to 
respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's 
representation of the client" (Br. of Appellant at 17-18). 
However, the rule's commentary indicates that when "the integrity 
of the lawyer's own conduct is involved, the principle of 
confidentiality may have to yield." Comment, Disclosure Adverse 
to Client, Utah R. Prof. Conduct 1.6. Thus Utah's ethical rules 
appear to comport with evidentiary Rule 504(d)(3), above.10 
Defendant's withdrawal of the counsel ineffectiveness 
allegation may have obliged the trial court to disregard attorney 
Allen's affidavit, given in response. The allegation had been 
made by defendant acting pro se (R. 61-62); perhaps his lack of 
legal expertise should excuse him from thus "opening the door" to 
Allen's affidavit, especially since subsequently-obtained counsel 
10To the extent this issue implicates ethical rules of attorney 
conduct, this Court may wish to proceed with caution. Article 
VIII, section 4 of the Utah Constitution, and Utah Code Ann. § 78-
2-4(3) (1992) may make construction of those rules the sole 
province of the Utah Supreme Court: "The [Utah] Supreme Court by 
rule shall govern the practice of law, including admission to 
practice law and the conduct and discipline of persons admitted to 
practice law." The code chapter that created this Court grants it 
no similar disciplinary authority. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-l 
through -5 (1992). 
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withdrew the ineffectiveness allegation. This, however, is by no 
means certain. 
Even absent a claim of counsel ineffectiveness, or some 
other clear dispute between counsel and former client, counsel 
may breach the attorney-client privilege in certain instances. 
Again, the commentary to ethical Rule 1.6(b)(4) reflects that 
counsel is permitted, in his or her professional discretion, to 
reveal client communication in order to prevent subsequent 
fraudulent client conduct. Comment, Disclosure Adverse to 
Client, Utah R. Prof. Conduct 1.6. Attorney Allen, if he 
perceived defendant to be falsely alleging that his guilty pleas 
were not knowingly and voluntarily entered, could have 
legitimately breached the attorney-client privilege in order to 
prevent such fraud. 
In fact, attorney Allen's affidavit appears 
appropriately limited to information that an attorney "may 
reveal" under Rule 1.6(b). Nowhere, for example, does he reveal 
any admission of actual guilt by his former client. He merely 
states his assessment of defendant's ability to understand and 
deliberate upon the evidence, and upon the options available to 
him in the face of that evidence (R. 97-102, addendum B to Br. of 
Appellant). He does not reveal actual attorney-client 
communications, as that term is defined in evidentiary Rule 
504(a)(5) ("communications" include lawyer's advice, and the 
client's disclosures). Allen's affidavit presents an opinion 
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arising from attorney-client communications, but not the 
communications themselves• 
B. Any Error in Admitting Former Counsel's Affidavit 
was Harmless. 
Finally, Allen's affidavit really does no more than 
reiterate what is already clear in the record created when 
defendant actually entered his guilty pleas. Again, defendant's 
colloquy with the trial court, along with his written expiation 
agreement, show that he carefully considered his options, and 
decided to plead guilty, under a plea bargain, to lesser 
offenses. Accordingly, any error in the consideration of 
attorney Allen's affidavit was harmless: the knowing and 
voluntary nature of defendant's guilty pleas was amply set forth 
in other, clearly admissible evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, was amply 
obeyed by the trial court when defendant's guilty pleas were 
entered in 1985. On the record then made, it is also clear that 
defendant voluntarily and knowingly entered those pleas. Those 
pleas were therefore valid as a matter of rule and of 
constitutional law. For these reasons alone, the trial court's 
denial of defendant's later motion to withdraw his guilty pleas 
should be affirmed. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 15* day of October, 1992. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
J. KEVIN MURPHY v 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing brief of appellee was mailed, postage prepaid, to Jo 
Carol Nesset-Sale, HALEY & STOLEBARGER, 10th Floor Walker Center, 
175 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, attorneys for 
defendant-appellant, this ' ^> day of October, 1992. 
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Defendant's Memorandum of Clarification 
JO CAROL NESSET-SALE #2398 
HALEY & STOLEBARGER 
Tenth Floor, Walker Center 
175 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 801/531-1555 
Facsimile: 801/328-1419 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
*Liz»* 






t MEMORANDUM OF CLARIFICATION 
: OF PENDING MOTION 
: Case No. 900902323 
Judge David O. Roth 
The Plaintiff, Steven Stilling, by and through his 
attorney, Jo Carol Nesset-Sale, hereby files this memorandum to 
clarify the nature of the hearing set for October 9, 1991. 
Although variously styled in prior pleadings as a 
Petition for Post Conviction Relief to Set Aside Guilty Plea or 
Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, the relief sought has 
been vacation of the guilty pleas of Steven Stilling (hereinafter 
"Defendant11) to multiple counts of Robbery, a second degree felony, 
which were entered on or about the 13th day of February, 1985, by 
the Second District Court, the Hon. Ronald 0. Hyde presiding. 
In response to the pleadings the State filed a Motion to 
Dismiss, claiming that the allegations made in the petition were 
unsupported and that a writ may not substitute for a direct appeal. 
.143 
An accurate characterization of Defendant's pleading 
intention is a Motion to Withdraw His Guilty Pleas; that is the 
name of the proper motion that should be before the court and 
Defendant hereby restyles his pleadings to conform to that intent. 
The basis for the motion is that Judge Hyde did not 
substantially comply with the requirements of Rule 11 of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, the standard that applies to guilty 
pleas that were taken prior to State v. Gibbons, 740 P. 2d 1309 
(Utah 1987). In the court's most recent case on the withdrawal of 
guilty pleas# State v. Hoff. 164 Utah Adv. Rep. 21, (July 3, 1991), 
it clarified the pre- and post-Gibbons standards. (A copy is 
attached hereto.) It requires that the record be sufficient to 
support the conclusion that a Defendant "understood the elements of 
the crimes charged and how those elements related to the facts.11 
Id. at p.24. 
The critical issue before this court then is whether the 
record of the proceeding before Judge Hyde meets the requisite 
standard. Because of the opinions in Gibbons and Hoff and the 
cases cited therein, it is clear that the court requires that the 
record made at the time of the taking of the guilty plea supports 
a finding of substantial compliance with Rule 11, else the guilty 
plea may be withdrawn. 
Consequently, the Affidavit of Bernie Allen, executed at 
the request of the State nearly six years after the entry of 
Defendants guilty pleas, is irrelevant as that affidavit is not 
part of the record before Judge Hyde; and it is that record that 
2 
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must show substantial compliance with Rule 11. 
Defendant contends that the record demonstrates a lack of 
substantial compliance with Rule 11, and expects to argue its 
failings on October 9. 
Additionally, prior to the 1989 amendment, Utah Code 
Annotated 77-13-6 permitted the withdrawal of a guilty plea "upon 
good cause shown and with leave of court." No time limit was 
imposed until April 24, 1989, when (2)(b) became effective; it 
requires such motions to be made within thirty days of entry of the 
plea. Hoff involved a plea entered in 1985 and sought to be 
withdrawn in 1990. The appellate court did not find it to be 
untimely. 
Based on the record before Judge Hyde, Defendant will 
urge the court to find a lack of substantial compliance with Rule 
11 and permit Defendant to withdraw his guilty pleas. 
Dated this /0 day of September, 1991. 
Jo Cfc*ol Nesset-Sale 
Att/xrney for Defendant 
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Now between now and the 7th we will have a deter-
mination on that. 
THE COURT: All right. So the other trial date 
will just stand. 
MR. ALLEN: Right. 
MR. DAINES: That is fine. 
THE COURT: Don't lose track of this one. 
MR. ALLEN: We won't lose track of them. 
THE COURT: You're past the 120 days now anyway 
MR. ALLEN: We were past that before January 8th, 
way back in December. 
MR. DAINES: This was set on today's calendar, so 
the record is clear, for a plea of guilty. 
MR. ALLEN: For plea, that's correct. 
THE COURT: All right. Anything else? 
MR. ALLEN: No, Your Honor. 
FEBRUARY 13, 1985 SESSION 
THE COURT: State vs. Steven Stillings. 
THE COURT: Are you ready? 
MR. ALLEN: This is here today for change of plea 
The State is intending to file an amended information to 
16269, 71 and 72,amending to robberies, second degree felonies^ 
The defendant is intending to enter a plea of guilty 
to those three. 
51 EVELYN STORRS, C.S.R. 




























THE COURT: Now you filed three amended 
informations. 
MR. DAINES: That's correct. 
THE COURT: All right, Mr. Stillings, I have to 
go over this with you to make sure that it's knowledgeable 
and voluntary; you understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
MR. ALLEN: We have prepared an expiation 
agreement that I would like to give to the court. Your Honor 
has already seen a copy. (hands document to the court) 
THE COURT: Now, Mr. Stillings, the State has now 
filed three amended informations, now charging second degree 
felonies, robbery by force and fear. They were first degree 
felonies, committed with the use of a firearm. 
The first degree felony with a firearm carried five 
years to life, plus one, plus possibly five. You understand 
that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: The second degree felony carry not 
less than one year nor more than fifteen years. 
They are both felonies, however. You do understand 
that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: All right; Now if I understand 
orrectly,you now intend to plead guilty to these informations 
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THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Now you understand when you enter a 
plea of guilty you are waiving your right to a trial by jury? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: If you go to trial you have the right 
to be confronted by witnesses against you, which means have 
them here, submit them to cross examination,test them for 
truthfulness, veracity, etc. You have the subpoena power of 
the State behind you in ordering witnesses in for your side. 
You also waive those rights when you plead guilty. 
You understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Now at all times you have the 
privilege against self-incrimination, which means if you go 
to trial you cannot be required to take the witness stand,or 
you may do so if you want to. 
When you plead guilty, you are admitting the unlawful 
act and intenti to the extent that you incriminate yourself 
by your plea. You understand that? 
MR. ALLEN: He's not intending to admit guilt, 
Your Honor. He understands that that's the effect as far as 
Your Honor's concerned in terms of sentencing and such, that 
the effect of that is that Your Honor is to assume guilt, tha 
the defendant is pleading guilty under, his rights to accept 
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is not admitting guilt. 
THE COURT: But you understand your plea will be 
treated by me as an admission of guilt and sentence imposed 
thereon? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, for sentencing. Sure. 
THE COURT: All right. If you are convicted at 
trial you have the right of appeal to the Supreme Court. 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: When you plead guilty, you don't 
leave much to appeal from. You understand that? 
MR. ALLEN: We understand that there— 
THE COURT: (inposing) I understand that this 
one ruling we made in regard to your motion to dismiss you 
intend to appeal to the Sppreme Court, the previous order? 
MR. ALLEN: That's right. 
THE COURT: But in regard to the pleas to the 
information itself? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Other than the filing 
of the amended:information, which is second degree felonies, 
have you been given any promises to cause a plea? 
MR. ALLEN: Mr. Daines has agreed to recommend 
some credit for time served regarding the offense, but other 
than that and the fact that we are intending to appeal that 
5i4 EVELYN STORRS, C.S.R. 
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. issue on the detainer. But other than that, no. 
2 THE COURT: But you realize as far as I am 
3 concerned, I will just be required to impose sentence. 
4„ THE DEFENDANT: I understand. 
B I I THE COURT: All right. Has anyone made any 
. threats to coerce a plea in any way? 
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. 
THE COURT: You are not under the influence of 
any drugs or alcohol, or anything that will confuse your 
mind? 
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. 
THE COURT: Your head is clear? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: You have had ample time to go over 
this with counsel? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 





















THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: You feel you understand it? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: All right. Now he's also handed me 
a document entitled Expiation Agreement, which is multi-paged 
document, at the end of each paragraph is a place for the 
defendant's initials. This bears the initials "S.S.". I 
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j take it that means that you've been over this. If there's 
2 any questions he has explained them, and that's the purpose 
s of the initials at the end of each paragraph? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
,11 THE COURT: This goes over in greater detail 
.. than what I just went over with you, right? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Let's see. What have we 
got? 16269, 16271, 16272, huh? And the State is going to 
be moving to dismiss the other one? 
MR. DAINES: Yes, Your Honor. 
I might state for the record that the reason the 
State is willing to reduce these three charges one degree for 
the purpose of a plea is that (1) Mr. Stillings has an 
extensive prior record, and I think it is pretty obvious he 
will be sent to prison on this. (2) At a previous hearing 
Your Honor had ordered that the State will pay for witnesses 
to be brought in by the defense. And because of the fact 
that Salt Lake has many more cases than we do, and because 
of the expense to the county of bringing all these witnesses 
in, his plea to this, which will sentence him to prison, is 
sufficient for us. 
I have gone over this with the police department, and 
this is what they want to do. It would be very costly to 
bring the number of witnesses that he is requesting. 
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THE COURT: Well, Mr. Stillings, let's start 
2II with 16269. The charge is second degree felony, robbery 
3 I  How do you plead to that amended Information'? 
THE DEFENDANT: Guilty, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: And 16271 now charges a second degree 
felony, robbery. How do you plead? 
THE DEFENDANT: Guilty, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: And 16272 also charges a second 
degree felony, robbery. How do you plead? 
THE DEFENDANT: Guilty, Your Honor. 
MR. ALLEN: Your Honor, we would waive time for 
sentencing at this time. 
I do have two things I would like to submit to the 
court. One is a notice of appeal and designation of record. 
The other is an affidavit that Mr. Richards put out. He, 
because of his inability to be here at the hearings and 
decisions that were made prior, wanted to put into the 
record an affidavit stating his position on the thing. 
THE COURT: That is just a matter of filing. 
MR. ALLEN: That's correct. We are going to 
file those, although I have brought only one copy there are 
three files. I'll have to make additional copies. But we 
are filing these concurrent. 
MR. DAINES: Your Honor, I would like to reserve 
the right to file my own statement or position against his 
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jl since he wasn't here, because I don't agree with some of the 
2 things he said. 
3 THE COURT: Well, you can file that. 
4 MR. DAINES: Thank you. 
5 THE COURT: Mr. Stillings, you're entitled to 
6 time before I sentence you. You are requesting that I 
7 sentence you at this time? 
8 MR. ALLEN: Yes, Your Honor, the defendant has 
9 one request to make. He has got as you can see a thing 
l0 wrong with his hand. He has just had a carpel tunnel syndromi 
n surgery. There is one remaining visit that needs to be made 
12 on Monday. 
13 THE DEFENDANT: I don't know. He believes it 
will be on Monday. 
15 THE COURT: Well, once I impose sentence I lose 
16 jurisdiction. 
17 MR. ALLEN: Well, he would like that in light of 
18 sentence, and stay his transportation until Tuesday if 
19 possible. 
20 THE DEFENDANT: Is it this week, the appointment; 
x do you know? 
22 MR. ALLEN: If he's not taken down Thursday he 
23 will not go down until Tuesday, and that will allow him to 
24 take care of that. 
gg THE COURT: But I normally do not control the 
sheriff's department. 
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MR. ALLEN; I understand that. I believe that if 
Your Honor made that request they would abide by it. 
THE COURT: What is it, a local doctor? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, they did the operation at 
McKay Dee on my wrist. 
THE COURT: You have to go back for what? 
THE DEFENDANT One more finger. There is the 
problem still there in one of the fingers. He wanted to see 
me. I was supposed to have been there last week when I was 
in jail in Salt Lake. I missed this court appearance arid 
that, and my doctor's appointment. So now it is rescheduled 
until this week. 
THE COURT: The jail didn't send you. Salt Lake 
sent up. 
MR. ALLEN: Yes, but because of that he did have 
difficulty missing his last appointment with the doctor. 
It would be helpful both to whoever will be treating him and 
the prison to have that final meeting with the doctor. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. ALLEN: We're ready to be sentenced. 
THE COURT: All right. On File 16269, you are 
then sentenced to a term in the state penitentiary, not less 
than one year nor more than fifteen. 
On 16271, you are sentenced to serve a term not less 
than one year nor more than fifteen years. 
And 16272, you are sentenced to a term not less than 
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: Okay, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Now what's the other-one? 
MR. ALLEN: 16270. 
5II MR. DAINES: Case 16270, the State would move to 
6 dismiss. 
7I THE COURT: 16270? 
MR. ALLEN: Also there is the habitual. 
g I  MR. DAINES: The enhancement. 
10 THE COURT: Pardon? 
jjl MR. DAINES: The enhancement. We are making a 
12 motion to dismiss. He is not pleading to the enahancement on 
13 „ this 
14 II MR. ALLEN: The habitual criminal charge. 
THE COURT: It is in the 70? 
MR. DAINES: It's in all of them? 
THE DEFENDANT: Just one. 
MR. DAINES: Which one is it? 
THE COURT: Well, it is not part of the complaintj 
or information. 
THE DEFENDANT: It's a separate information, 
Your Honor. 
MR. DAINES: It wasn't part of the amended 
24 information, Your Honor, so it is not there. 
THE DEFENDANT: Okay. 
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THE COURT: Your motion to dismiss 16270 will be 
granted. 
MR. DAINES: Thank you, Your Honor. 
REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
6 (I This is to certify that I, Evelyn S. Funk, am 
7 one of the official court reporters of the Second Judicial 
8 District Court of Utah; that I was present in court during 
9 the above hearings in the aforesaid matter; that thereat I 
10 reported in stenograph the proceedings had. 
11 The foregoing pages of transcript, 1 to 6l, 
12 inclusive, constitute a full, true and accurate transcript 
13 of my said stenographic notes of said hearings. 
14 Dated and signed this 17th day of February, 
15 1 1985. 
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APPENDIX 3 
Second Amended Informations, to Which Defendant Pleaded Guilty 
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STEVEN M. STILLINGS 
Defendant. 
DOB: 4/19/51 
FEB 15 11 i«>if£5r 
AMENDED INFOBUfrlON 
WEE EH . , ^LEfiK' 
Circuit No. 84-333F 
District No. 16*69 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF WEBER ) s s « 
The undersigned Complainant upon oath s t a t e s that the 
Complainant has reason t o be l i eve that the above named Defendant on or about the 
31 ST day of MARCH, 1984 in Weber County, State of Utah committed a 
second degree felony to-wit: 
ROBBERY, 76-6-301 UCA as follows: 
Said defendant did unlawfully take personal property in the possession of Ted 
Browne (U & I COOP) from his person, or immediate presence, against his w i l l , 
accomplished by means of force or fear. 
WILLIAM F. DAINES, Ccmplainan ai a t 
Case No. ROY PD 84-1649 
This information i s based on evidence obtained from the following witnesses: 
RODNEY BAILEY 
TOD MC EL YE A 
LT. ROCHELL, ROY PD 
Authorized for presentment 
and fil ing: 
DONALD C. HUGHES, 
COUNTY ATTORNEY ~ 
DEPUTY WILLIAM F. DAINES 
Subscribed and sworn t o 
before me this 14 th day 
of January, 1985. 
L£LL /ru. NOTARY PUBLi 
Residing i n Weber >66unty, Utah 
My commission exp ires : 11/1/87 
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STEVEN M. STILLINGS 
Defendant. 
DOB: V19 /51 
AMENDED INFi 
WEBER ;.. • • 
RIC!!A:;|.K o.vj 
Circuit No. 8H-335F 
D i s t r i c t No. 16271 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF WEBER ) s s « 
The undersigned Complainant upon oath s t a t e s that the 
Complainant has reason t o be l i eve that the above named Defendant on or about the 
31st day of March, 1984 in Weber County, State of Utah committed a 
second degree felony t o - w i t : 
ROBBERY, 76-6-301 UCA as f o l l o w s : 
Said defendant did unlawfully take personal property in the possess ion of Earl 
Deroboam from his person, or immediate presence, against h i s w i l l , accomplished 
by means of force or fear . 
WILLIAM F. DAINES, Complainant 
Case No. OPD 84-9162 
This information i s based on evidence obtained from the fo l lowing w i t n e s s e s : 
EARL DE ROB0AM 
TOM HADDLEY 
C. M. ZIMMERMAN, OPD 
Authorized for presentment 
and fi l ing: 
DONALD C HUGHES, 
COUNTY ATTORNEY 
Subscribed and sworn t o 
before me t h i s 14 th day 
of January, 1985. 
BY 
3TARY PUBLIC 
Residing i n Weber bounty, Utah 
My commission exp ires : 11/1/87 
DEPUTY WILLIAM F. DAINES 
260 
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 






RICH;."-. • • "••--
Circuit No. 84-336F 
D i s t r i c t No. 16272 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF WEBER ) s s « 
The undersigned Complainant upon oath s t a t e s that the 
Complainant has reason t o be l i eve that the above named Defendant on or about the 
31st day of March, 1984 in Weber County, State of Utah committed a 
second degree felony to-wit: 
ROBBERY, 76-6-301 UCA as follows: 
Said defendant did unlawfully take personal property in the possession of 
Dorothy Smith (Wangsgard's Market) from her person, or immediate presence, 
against her wi l l , accomplished by means of force or fear. 
WILLIAM F. DAINES, Complainant 
Case No. OPD 84-9154 




Authorized for presentment 
and fi l ing: 
DONALD C. HUGHES, 
COUNTY ATTORNEY 
BY [AjdukjtHM^-W<*JU^ 
DEPUTY WILLIAM F. DAINES 
Subscribed and sworn t o 
before me t h i s 14 th day 
of January, 1985. 
NOTARY PUBLIC /IT) 
Residing i n Weber County, Utah 
My commission exp ires : 11/1/76 
APPENDIX 4 
Expiation Agreement, 
Submitted Contemporaneously with Pleas 
(NOTE: The expiation agreement is reproduced 
in all four records on appeal. Citations in 
this brief are to pages in the record of the 
plea withdrawal motion, as circled in the 
reproductions contained in this appendix) 
Bernard L. Allen of 
PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
Attorney for Defendant 
2568 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: 3994194 
F E B ! " 2s3PJjife 
RICilA:-;' •> 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF WEBER, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STEVEN M. STILLINGS, 
Defendant. 
EXPIATION AGREEMENT 
Case No. i±^f^7% 
1. As your attorney, I advise you that I have*gone 
over the facts of your cases very carefully, and have talked 
with the State's key witness and have the statements of all 
the witnesses which the law enforcement officers and the 
prosecuting attorney claim to have. 
2. As I have explained to you, you are charged with 







*plus one to five 
years gun enhancement 
3. With your concurrence, I have discussed with prosecutor 
William F. Daines, the possibility of your entering 









Five to Life * 
Five to Life * 
Five to Life * 
Five to Life * 

































or As Charged 
Agg. Robbery Robbery 
Agg. Robbery Robbery 
Agg. Robbery Robbery 
Agg. Robbery Robbery 








One to Fifteen years 
One to Tifteen years 
One to Fifteen years 
One to Fifteen years 
A. The prosecutor for the State of Utah has further 
agreed that it is understood that the Defendant is reserving his 
right to appeal the District Court Judge's decision wherein he 
refused to dismiss the State's compalints upon Defendant's motion 
that the State had failed to comply with provisions of the 
interstate agreement on detainers act. Said Motion having corre 
on for hearing before the Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde on January 4, 
1985. In addition, the prosecutor agrees to recommend credit for 
the time Defendant has served in jail awaiting trial. 
I, THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT, HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGES THAT 
5. It is my decision to enter a plea of guilty to the 
information now on file against me in the above entitled 
court, a copy of which I have received, and that I am entering 
a plea voluntarily and of my own free will after conferring 
with my undersigned attorney. 
6. Under the circumstances, as we have discussed them, 
Judge Hyde's decision not to grant dismissal of the charges 
based on the State's failure to comply with the interstate 
agreement on detainers act, has left me in a position of severe 
exposure of being convicted on the 1st degree felonies originally 
charged against me. As a result of that decision, I agree with 
you that we should work out a plea as above described. 
7. I clearly understand that if I desired to go to 
trial, that you would be happy to represent me and would do 
everything legally and ethically possible to secure me 
acquittal. 
8. I advise the Court that I enter this plea with a 
knowledge and understanding of the following facts: 
a. I know that I have a constitutional right under 
the Constitution of Utah and of the United States, to plead 
not guilty and to have a jury trial upon the charge to*which I 
have entered a plea of guilty, or to a trial by the Court 
should I elect to waive a trial by jury. I know I have a right 
to be represented by the undersigned attorney. 
SS 
Defendant's In i t i a l s 
dS2 
b. I know that if I wish to have a trial in court 
upon the charge, I have a right to be confronted by the 
witnesses against me by having them testify in open court in 
my presence and before the court and jury with the right to 
have witnesses cross-examined by my attorney. I also know 
that I have a right to have witnesses subpoenaed by the 
State at its expense to testify in -court upon my behalf and 
that I could, if I elected to do so, testify in court on my 
own behalf, and that if I choose not to do so, the jury can 
and will be told that this may not be held against me if I 
choose to have the jury so instructed. 
Defendant's Initials 
c. I know that if I were to have a trial that the 
State must prove each and every element of the crime charged 
to the satisfaction of the court or jury beyond a reasonable 
doubt; and that I would have no obligation to offer any 
evidence myself; and that any verdict rendered by a jury, 
whether it be that of guilty or not guilty, must be by a 
unanimous of all jurors.
 A 
Defendant's Initials 
d. I know that under the Constitutions of Utah and of 
the United States, that I have a right against selfincrimination 
(a right not to give evidence against myself), and that this 
means that I cannot be compelled to testify #in Court at a 
trial unless I choose to do so. 
64 
befendantfs Initials 
e. I know that under the Constitution of Utah, thai if ^ 
I woro tried and convicted by -a jury or by-~t-he—Gousrt, that I 
would have a right to appeal my conviction and sentence to 
the Supreme Court of Utah, for review of the trial proceedings, 
and that if I could not afford to pay the costs of such 
appeal, that those costs would be paid by the State without 
















f. I am entering a plea of guilty with the following 
understanding of its effect of my consititutional rights as 
set out in the five (5) preceding paragraphs. My plea is entered 
not because I am guilty of the offenses charged against me, 
but because I feel that under the circumstances it is in my 
best interest to accept the plea bargin as negotiated btween 
my attorney at the State, I know and understand that by 
entering a plea of guilty I am waiving my constitutional rights 
as set out in four (4) paragraphs above, a through d. However, 
I am expressly reserving my right to appeal the Judge's decision 
on my motion to dismiss, based on the State's failure to comply 




g. I know that under the laws of Utah, the possible 
maximum sentence that can and may be imposed upon my plea of 
guilty to the charge identified on page one of this agreement, 
are set out in paragraph 3 above. I also know that if I am 
on probation, parole or awaiting sentencing upon another 
offense of which I have been convicted or to which I have 
pleaded guilty, my plea in the present action may result in 
consecutive sentences being imposed upon me. ^ 
Defendant's Initials 
h. I know that the fact that I have entered a plea of 
guilty does not mean that the Court will not impose either a 
fine or sentence of imprisonment upon me and no promises 
have been made by anyone as to what the sentence will be if 





i. No one has forced or threatened or coerced me 
to make me plead guilty and I am doing so, of my own free 
will, and after discussing it with ray attorney. I know that 
any opinions he may have expressed to me as to what he 
believes the court may do are not binding on the court. I 
understand that neither the prosecutor nor ray attorney have 
promised or made any assurance as to what sentence the judge 
will eventually impose. 
5b 
Defendant's I n i t i a l s 
CiCA 
-5-
j. No promise of any kind have been made to induce 
me to plead guilty except that I have been told that if I do j 
plead guilty, the other charge pending against me will be | 
dismissed as set out in paragraphs 3 and 4 above, I am also i 
aware that any charge or* sentencing concessions or recommendations 
for probation or suspended sentences, including a reduction ! 
of the charges for sentencing, made or sought by either ! 
defense counsel or counsel for the State, is not binding on I 
the court and may not be approved and followed by the court. 
5 ^  
Defendant's Initials 
k. I am not now under the influence of either 
Defendant's Initials 
9. I have read this agreement, or I have had it read to 
me by ray attorney, and I know and understand it contents. I 
am\*>years of age, have attended school through j^grade, and 
I can read and understand the English language. I have i 
discussed its contents with my attorney and ask the court to 
accept my plea of guilty to the charge set forth above in j 
this agreement. 
drugs or alcohol 
DATED this \b day February, 1985 
DEFENDANT A 
or**-
expiation means to make satisfaction for, atone for, or to 
appease.) 
CERTIFICATE OF DEFENSE ATTORNEY: 
I certify that I am the attorney for the above named 
defendant, and I know they have read this agreement, or that 
I have read it to them, and I discussed it with them and 
believe they fully understand the meaning of its contents 
and is mentally and physically competent. To the best of my 
knowledge and belief, the statements, representations and 
declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing agreement 
are in all aspects accurate and true. 
O R D E R 
The signature of the defendant was acknowledged in the 
presence of the undersigned judge. 
Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing Expiation 
Agreement, the court finds the defendant's plea guilty is 
freely and voluntarily made and it is ordered that defendant's 
plea of "guilty" to the charge set forth in the agreement be 
accepted and entered. 
DONE in Court this _day of February, 1985, 
JDDCT 
APPENDIX 5 
Sentences Imposed Upon Guilty Pleas 
# M f t 8 fc 111 IDF 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF hsBER COUNTY, STATEfW^' 
State of Utah, 
vs. 




COMMITMENT TO UTAhTSTATE 
PRISON 
No. 1 6 2 6 9 
Defendant having been convicted by []a jury; [ 1 the court; ^ p l e a of guilty; 
[] plea of no contest; of the offense of ROSLERY > a 
felony of the 2nc* degree, being now present in court and ready for sentence, 
is now adjudicated guilty of the above offense and is now sentenced as follows: 
1nlt?als THE BASIC SENTENCE 
[] not to exceed five (5) years at the Utah State Prison; 
- fa^ ^^xnot less than one (1) year nor more than fifteen (15) years at Utah State Prison; 
[] not less than five (5) years and which may be for life at Utah State Prison; 
C ] to pay fine in the amount of $ . 
ENHANCED PUNISHMENT FOR FIREARM USE 
Defendant is additionally sentenced as follows: 
[] one (1) year at Utah State Prison, pursuant to 76-3-203(1), (2) or (3); 
[] not to exceed five (5) years at Utah State Prison pursuant to 76-3-203(1),(2) or (3); 
[] not less than five (5) years nor more than ten (10) years at Utah State Prison, 
pursuant to 76-3-203(4); 
said sentence to run consecutive to the basic sentence as set forth above, 
HABITUAL CRIMINAL ALTERNATIVE PUNISHMENT 
Upon a finding that the defendant is in the status of an habitual criminal, the 
defendant is sentenced to: 
[] not less than five (5) years and which may be for life at Utah State Prison, 
RESTITUTION 
[] Defendant is ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $ , to 
n Defendant is remanded into custody of: 
'• & ^^x the Sheriff of this county, for delivery to the Warden or other appropriate 
official at the Utah State Prison for execution of sentence; or 
[] the Warden for execution of this sentence. 
nn-rm *u• 1 3 t h -. * February
 1 n 8 5 DATED this day of 7 19 
HTEST: Richard Greene , County Clerk ^ DISTRICT JUDGE 
fr -^ J, • ,^+i V ^ // , Deputy Clerk
 Q Q 
WF R V P 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
State of Utah, ) JUDGMENT, SENTENCE, AND 
vs. { COMMITMENT TO UTAH STATE 
) 
STEVEN M. STILLTVSS . ) 
Defendant. 
PRISON 
) No. 1 6 2 7 1 V 
) 
—00O00— 
Defendant having been convicted by []a jury; [ 1 the court acixbplea of guilty; 
[] plea of no contest; of the offense of ROBBERY
 f a 
felony of the ^ n d degree, being now present in court and ready for sentence, 
is now adjudicated guilty of the above offense and is now sentenced as follows: 
initials THE BASIC SENTENCE 
[] not to exceed five (5) years at the Utah State Prison; 
[>3x not less than one (1) year nor more than fifteen (15) years at Utah State Prison; 
[] not less than five (5) years and which may be for life at Utah State Prison; 
[ ] to pay fine in the amount of $ - . 
- £ 
ENHANCED PUNISHMENT FOR FIREARM USE 
Defendant is additionally sentenced as follows: 
[] one (1) year at Utah State Prison, pursuant to 76-3-203(1), (2) or (3); 
[] not to exceed five (5) years at Utah State Prison pursuant to 76-3-203(1),(2) or (3); 
•[ ] not less than five (5) years nor more than ten (10) years at Utah State Prison, 
pursuant to 76-3-203(4); 
said sentence to run consecutive to the basic sentence as set forth above. 
HABITUAL CRIMINAL ALTERNATIVE PUNISHMENT 
Upon a finding that the defendant is in the status of an habitual criminal, the 
defendant is sentenced to: 
[] not less than five (5) years and which may be for life at Utah State Prison. 
RESTITUTION 
[] Defendant is ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $ , to 
Defendant is remanded into custody of: 
ki the Sheriff of this county, for delivery to the Warden or other appropriate 
official at the Utah State Prison for execution of sentence; or 
[] the Warden for execution of this sentence. 
DATED this 15th day of February 193J5 r 7 /) 
ATTEST: Richard Greene
 % County Clerk £ DISTRICT JUDG£; 
By - - N // 's<*. i / '~?. ' f , Deputy Clerk 
Oil 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
State of Utah, 
vs. 
STEVEN M. STILLINGS 
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE, ANO 
COMMITMENT TO UTAH STATE 
PRISON 
No. 16272 Ur Defendant. 
—00O00— 
Defendant having been convicted by []a jury; [ 1 the court; ^ Jfclea of guilty; 
[ ] plea of no contest; of the offense of PREPPY > a 
felony of the 2n<3 degree, being now present in court and ready for sentence, 
is now adjudicated guilty of the above offense and is now sentenced as follows: 
initials THE BASIC SENTENCE 
[] not to exceed five (5) years at the Utah State Prison; 
-Of [>3x:tfot less than one (1) year nor more than fifteen (15) years at Utah State Prison; 
[] not less than five (5) years and which may be for life at Utah State Prison; 
[ ] to pay fine in the amount of $ . 
ENHANCED PUNISHMENT FOR FIREARM USE 
Defendant is additionally sentenced as follows: 
[] one (1) year at Utah State Prison, pursuant to 76-3-203(1), (2) or (3); 
[] not to exceed five (5) years at Utah State Prison pursuant to 76-3-203(1),(2) or (3); 
[] not less than five (5) years nor more than ten (10) years at Utah State Prison, 
pursuant to 76-3-203(4); 
said sentence to run consecutive to the basic sentence as set forth above. 
HABITUAL CRIMINAL ALTERNATIVE PUNISHMENT 
Upon a finding that the defendant is in the status of an habitual criminal, the 
defendant is sentenced to: 
[] not less than five (5) years and which may be for life at Utah State Prison. 
RESTITUTION 
[] Defendant is ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $ , to 
?JL 
Defendant is remanded into custody of: 
[x}c the Sheriff of this county, for delivery to the Warden or other appropriate 
official at the Utah State Prison for execution of sentence; or 
[ ] the Warden for execution of this sentence. 
DATED this ^ 1 % of F e b r u a ry 19 8S _ ^ 
/ 
Richard Greene ?C&u*'C/'/''/'{Js J/!?*-< ^ 
TEST: , County Clerk £ DISTRICT JUDGE -
- • ' * -*, H 's sf, Deputy Clerk Q 4 n 
